4 edition of Double moral hazard, monitoring, and the nature of contracts found in the catalog.
Double moral hazard, monitoring, and the nature of contracts
Includes bibliographical references.
|Series||Working paper series ;, no. E/231/2003, Working paper series (Institute of Economic Growth (India)) ;, no. E/2003/231.|
|Contributions||Institute of Economic Growth (India)|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||21 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||21|
|LC Control Number||2004312780|
- contracts with a multi specialty group practice and separately with one or more hospitals, to provide comprehensive services to its member - physicians are employed but the practice, not the HMO - the HMO pays an all-iclusing capitation fee to the practice to provide physician services to its enrollees. Universal Economics shows the critical importance of property rights to the existence and success of market economies. The authors explain the interconnection between goods prices and productive-asset prices and how market-determined interest rates bring about the allocation of resources toward the satisfaction of consumption demands versus.
lective moral hazard and the necessity of macroprudential regulation: The social cost of 2 Standard arguments for going beyond the analysis of stand-alone bank solvency include the possi- bility of ﬁre sales, interconnectedness and the policy response to, say, widespread maturity by: Vertical integration would tend to mitigate bank moral hazard both by increasing the value of bank charters and by encouraging private monitoring of bank risks by commercial affiliates. As a matter of theory, the net effect of vertical integration on financial system stability is not clear.
 The top earners in finance do make a lot of money, but the average “banker” doesn’t. Median hourly wage in the finance and insurance sector is $, compared to $ in “Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services” or $ in information and communications. The financial industry is made up of a lot of average people earning an average salary putting in honest effort. Are you sure? NO YES. Are you sure?
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Moral hazard can be divided into two types when it involves asymmetric information (or lack of verifiability) of the outcome of a random event. An ex ante moral hazard is a change in behavior prior to the outcome of the random event, whereas ex post involves behavior after the outcome.
Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. No. 3 Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and ProfitabilityCited by: Managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates R&D to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention.
Double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal Cited by: 3. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pagesWinter. Russell Cooper & Thomas W.
Ross, "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pagesSpring. Moral Hazard and Corporate Governance against a double moral hazard problem (if one task retained). I show that delegation of both tasks tends to go hand in hand with agent asset ownership.
‘The significant new book, Above Politics, by Miller and Whitford, combines eloquent political theory with engaging examples and sophisticated analysis. In the tradition of the Federalist Papers, it provides a persuasive argument about the most important institutional design issues facing democracy today.’Cited by: Description: Specializing in mathematical economic theory, Journal of Economics focuses on microeconomic theory while also publishing papers on macroeconomic topics as well as econometric case studies of general interest.
Regular supplementary volumes are devoted to topics of central importance to both modern theoretical research and present economic reality. Downloadable. In this paper I study a class of repeated two-sided moral hazard problems with discounting.
I consider two agents who are involved in multiperiod, and possibly infinite-horizon, contractual relationships. In every period, the agents simultaneously take hidden actions, each of which independently affects the distribution of a separate random public signal.
Highlights The firms exert more marketing efforts in a supply chain with consumer learning. The marketing efforts decrease as consumers learn more about the product. The supplier shares more revenue to the retailer in a longer time horizon.
Information sharing is not always beneficial to enhance supply chain coordination. Double moral hazard may be by: 8. We develop a simple model of such revenue- or profit-sharing arrangements based on double-sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized : Meng Li.
The principal–agent problem, in political science and economics (also known as agency dilemma or the agency problem) occurs when one person or entity (the "agent"), is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of, or that impact, another person or entity: the "principal".
This dilemma exists in circumstances where agents are motivated to act in their own best interests, which are. Double Moral Hazard, Monitoring and the Nature of Contracts Incentives, Risk and Agency Costs in the Choice of Contractual Arrangements in Agriculture India's Exports: An Analysis.
Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons Foreword One of the most daunting challenges confronting our criminal justice sys-tem today is the overcrowding of our nation’s prisons. The past decade has witnessed a doubling of the number of adult offenders brought before our courts.
According to one estimate, as we begin the new millennium,File Size: 1MB. In this paper, we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members. In particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract, namely, the royalty structure and the monitoring technology.
We begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and Cited by: Public services in the United Kingdom have been transformed over the past 25 years with the introduction of market-oriented solutions into their provision.
This has been characterized by a shift Cited by: 1. Off Balance Sheet - OBS: Off balance sheet (OBS) items refer to assets or liabilities that do not appear on a company's balance sheet but that are nonetheless effectively assets or liabilities of. SAGE Video Bringing teaching, learning and research to life.
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if you have studied microeconomics, you may recall a concept called "moral hazard." moral hazard occurs when an economic agent is incentivized to take risks because some (or all) of the losses that might result will be borne by other economic agents.
How might federal deposit insurance, as administered by the FDIC, lead to moral hazard. Rationing in the General Theory of Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard.- Optimal Finance Contracts and Rationing in a Model of Double Moral Hazard.- Rationing and the Individual Rationality Constraint in a Parameterized Principal-Agent Problem.- Appendix: Sufficiency of the First-Order-Condition Approach.- References While the proponents of the DAO point to its decentralized nature, the structure of the DAO itself was projected to make use of “curators” and “contractors.” Curators were to control the addition of smart contracts, or project proposals, to the DAO by contractors, who would complete the approved project proposals in exchange for.
Double-trigger contracts differ from ordinary reinsurance contracts. The potential coverage from a double-trigger contract depends on both actuarial risk development and financial risk development.
(6) Thus, a double-trigger contract will pay only in situations where poor underwriting results can no longer be offset by good capital investment. Hiring a risk management consultant is a good investment for most companies.
A consultant can analyze a business and determine which risks should be covered by insurance.This paper examines the complex intra-day linkages between the U.S. equity securities market and the equity derivatives market.
The paper finds a positive, but short-lived, relationship between the two markets’ order flow activities, which relate to the supply, demand, and .